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”Device-independent” not only represents a relaxation of the security assumptions about the
internal working of the quantum devices, but also can enhance the security of the quantum com-
munication. In the paper, we put forward the first device-independent quantum secure direct com-
munication (DI-QSDC) protocol, where no assumptions are made about the way the devices work
or on what quantum system they operate. We show that in the absence of noise, the DI-QSDC
protocol is absolutely secure and there is no limitation for the communication distance. However,
under practical noisy quantum channel condition, the photon transmission loss and photon state
decoherence would reduce the communication quality and threaten its absolute security. For solv-
ing the photon transmission loss and decoherence problems, we adopt noiseless linear amplification
(NLA) protocol and entanglement purification protocol (EPP) to modify the DI-QSDC protocol.
With the help of the NLA and EPP, we can guarantee the absolute security of the DI-QSDC and
effectively improve its communication quality.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Dv, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography can provide an absolute ap-
proach to guarantee the security of communication based
on the basic principles of quantum mechanics. Quan-
tum cryptography began with quantum key distribution
(QKD), i. e., BB84 protocol [1]. Besides QKD, quan-
tum cryptography includes some other branches, such as
quantum secret sharing [2] and quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC) [3]. QKD can share a series of
secure keys between the sender (Alice) and the receiver
(Bob) [1, 4–7]. In QKD, in order to realize the secure
communication, the sender and the receiver should en-
sure that the encryption and decrypt processes are ab-
solutely secure. Moreover, they also require one-time
pad and perfect key management. Different from QKD,
QSDC provides us another secure communication ap-
proach. QSDC allows the sender to transmit secret mes-
sages to the receiver without sharing a key first. QSDC
has no key, no ciphertext, and either no key management.
The first QSDC protocol was proposed by Long et al.,
which exploited the properties of entanglement and a
block transmission technique [3]. QSDC can also be used
to achieve QKD with high capacity [8]. In 2003, the stan-
dard of QSDC was proposed [9]. Later, QSDC based on
single photon and high dimension system were proposed
[10, 11]. In the aspect of experiment, in 2016, Hu et al.
experimentally realized the QSDC with single photons
in a noisy environment using frequency coding [12]. In
2017, Zhang et al. successfully completed the QSDC ex-
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periment with quantum memory [13]. Recently, Zhu et
al. realized the first long-distance QSDC experiment in
fibre [14].
As a quantum cryptography mode, QSDC is also re-
quired to have absolute security. In QSDC protocols,
photons should be transmitted in quantum channel for
two rounds. For ensuring its absolute security and cor-
rectness, a security checking should be performed after
each photon transmission process [3, 9, 10]. The security
checking method is often similar as that of QKD proto-
cols, such as the BB84 protocol. The security analysis
for QKD has been widely discussed [15–20]. They often
assume that Alice and Bob have (almost) perfect control
of the state preparation and the measurement devices.
However, in practical experiment, this assumption is of-
ten critical. On the other hand, it has been proved that
the absolute security of BB84 protocol relies on the as-
sumption that Alice’s and Bob’s measurements act on
a two-dimensional space. If we relax this assumption to
the device-independent scenario, where Alice’s and Bob’s
measurements are extended to act on a four-dimensional
space, the security of BB84 protocol is no longer guar-
anteed [21–23]. In 2006, Ac´ın et al. firstly proposed the
device-independent quantum key distribution (DI-QKD)
protocol [24], which represents a relaxation of the se-
curity assumptions made in traditional QKD protocols
[23, 25, 26]. It only requires that quantum physics is cor-
rect and Alice and Bob do not allow any unwanted signal
to escape from their laboratories. DI-QKD requires the
Alice and Bob to perform the Bell test [27] (typically,
the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) test [28]) on
the pairs of entangled quantum systems shared between
them. The violation of a Bell (CHSH) inequality is a nec-
essary requirement for the security of a QKD protocol in
the general device-independent scenario.
2Inspired by DI-QKD protocols [22–25], in the paper,
we propose the first DI-QSDC protocol, which can lower
the requirement of experimental devices and enhance its
security in device-independent scenario. In the proto-
col, we treat the quantum apparatuses as black boxes
that produce classical outputs, possibly depending on the
value of some classical inputs. We perform the CHSH
tests in both two security checking processes and use the
violation of CHSH inequality to guarantee the security
of the DI-QSDC protocol. Similar as DI-QKD proto-
cols, the DI-QSDC protocol is absolutely secure under
ideal quantum channel condition. However, in practical
noisy quantum channel condition, the photon transmis-
sion loss and photon state decoherence caused by the
environmental noise seriously influence the DI-QSDC.
First, they weaken the non-local correlation between Al-
ice’s and Bob’s measurement results so that the maximal
secure communication distance of the DI-QSDC proto-
col is largely limited. Second, even within the tolerate
communication distance, the eavesdropper still has an
opportunity to steal some secret messages without be-
ing detected, for there is in principle no way of distin-
guishing the entanglement with an eavesdropper (caused
by her measurements) from the entanglement with the
environment (caused by innocent noise). Third, they
may unavoidably lead to message loss and message er-
ror. Therefore, in order to perform absolutely secure
and practical DI-QSDC protocol in practical noisy quan-
tum channel condition, we must solve the transmission
photon loss and decoherence problems. Fortunately, the
transmission photon loss problem can be solved by the
noiseless linear amplification (NLA) [29–34]. Recently,
the NLA protocols have been used in DI-QKD protocols
to compensate the photon transmission loss, which can
effectively increase the key rate and the maximal secure
communication distance [35–38]. Meanwhile, the deco-
herence problems can be effectively solved by entangle-
ment purification protocol (EPP) [39–43]. In this way,
we adopt the NLA and EPP to modify our DI-QSDC
protocol. With the help of NLA and EPP, we can in-
crease the secure communication distance and guarantee
the absolute security of our DI-QSDC protocol. Mean-
while, we can eliminate the message loss and effectively
reduce the quantum bit error. Therefore, our modified
DI-QSDC protocol has application potential in practical
noisy quantum channel condition.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we explain
our DI-QSDC protocol. In Sec. 3, we analyze the security
and communication quality of the DI-QSDC protocol. In
Sec. 4, we improve the DI-QSDC protocol with NLA
and EPP to resist to practical channel noise. In Sec. 5,
we analyze the security and communication quality of
the modified DI-QSDC protocol. In Sec. 6, we make a
conclusion.
II. THE DI-QSDC PROTOCOL
Our DI-QSDC protocol shows that its security is based
on a minimal set of fundamental assumptions. First, no
unwanted information from Alice’s and Bob’s physical lo-
cations can leak to outside. Second, quantum physics is
correct. Meanwhile, as we mainly analyze the effect from
the practical noisy quantum channel, we assume the per-
fect entanglement source which can generate maximally
entangled Bell states, the perfect quantum memory de-
vice with the storage efficiency of 100%, and the lossless
photon detector with the detection efficiency of 100%.
The basic principle of our DI-QSDC protocol is shown in
Fig. 1. Before operating the DI-QSDC protocol, Alice
and Bob have reached a consensus that each of the four
Bell states carries two-qubit of classical information, say
00, 01, 10, and 11 for |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, and |ψ−〉, respec-
tively. |φ±〉 and |ψ±〉 are four maximally entangled Bell
states, which can be written as
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉 ± |V V 〉),
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 ± |V H〉). (1)
Here, |H〉 and |V 〉 mean the horizontal and vertical po-
larization of the photon qubit, respectively.
The DI-QSDC protocol can be described as follows.
Step 1: Alice prepares an ordered N EPR pairs in the
state of |φ+〉 in her laboratory (N is large). She divides
the N EPR pairs into two photon sequences, including
the checking (C) photon sequence [C1, C2, C3, · · · , CN ]
and the message (M) photon sequence [M1,M2,M3, · · · ,
MN ]. Then, she sends the photons in the C sequence to
Bob successively through the quantum channel.
Step 2: Due to the environmental noise, the single pho-
ton may be completely lost during the transmission pro-
cess. The transmission efficiency η is a function of the
communication distance d, which can be written as [44]
η = 10−αd/10. (2)
The value of α is minimal in the ”telecom window”
around 1550 nm (α = 0.2 dB/km). On the other hand,
the environmental noise may also cause photon state de-
coherence. We assume the decoherence makes |φ+〉 de-
grade to a two-photon Werner state ρAB with the form
of [23]
ρAB = p|φ+〉AB〈φ+|+ (1− p)I
4
. (3)
Considering both photon transmission loss and decoher-
ence, Alice and Bob finally share N mixed states as
ρ1 = ηρAB +
1
2
(1− η)(|H〉A〈H |+ |V 〉A〈V |)
= ηp|φ+〉AB〈φ+|+ η(1 − p)I
4
+
1
2
(1− η)(|H〉A〈H |+ |V 〉A〈V |). (4)
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FIG. 1: The schematic principle of our DI-QSDC protocol. In the protocol, Alice prepares the ordered N EPR pairs in |φ+〉.
She divides the N EPR pairs into two sequences and sends one photon sequence to Bob. If the first photon transmission process
is secure, Alice encodes the EPR pairs using four unitary operations and sends the other photon sequence to Bob. Finally, Bob
can read the secret messages from Alice with the help of Bell-state analysis. In both two photon transmission processes, we
randomly select a sufficiently large subset of EPR pairs to make the security checking. We introduce the ”device-independent”
mode in both two security checking rounds, which can guarantee the absolute security of our protocol.
For ensuring the security of the first photon transmis-
sion process, Alice and Bob make the first round of se-
curity checking. In detail, Alice first randomly selects a
large sufficiently subset of photons from the M photon
sequence to make the security checking and publics their
positions to Bob through the classical channel. Then,
they store others photons in the quantum memory de-
vice. Alice and Bob independently performs measure-
ment chosen randomly on each of the security check-
ing photons in the M sequence and C sequence, re-
spectively. Alice has three possible measurements in
the basis |0〉 ± eiAi |1〉 (i = 0, 1, 2), where A0 = pi4 ,
A1 = 0, and A2 =
pi
2
. Bob has two possible mea-
surements choices in the basis |0〉 ± eiBi |1〉 (i = 1, 2),
where B1 =
pi
4
and B2 = −pi4 . All measurement results
a = {a0, a1, a2} and b = {b1, b2} have binary outcomes
labeled by a0, a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ {+1,−1}. If the parties ob-
tain the inconclusive result (the photon detectors click
no photon), the measurement result is set to be ”+1” or
”-1” randomly. After all the checking photon pairs have
been measured, Alice and Bob reveal their measurement
basis and measurement results in public classical channel.
Then, they can estimate the CHSH polynomial as
S1 = 〈a1b1〉+ 〈a1b2〉+ 〈a2b1〉 − 〈a2b2〉, (5)
where 〈aibj〉 is defined as P (a = b|ij) − P (a 6= b|ij).
Without loss of generality, we suppose that the marginal
of all the measurements are random, such as 〈ai〉 =
〈bj〉 = 0, i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}.
The amount of correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s
symbols is also quantified by the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) defined as
Q1 = P (a0 6= b1). (6)
According to the description above, both the photon
transmission loss and decoherence would increase the
value of QBER and reduce the CHSH polynomial. In
theory, Q1 can be calculated as
Q1 =
1
2
(1 − η) + η(1
2
− p
2
) =
1
2
(1− ηp). (7)
As shown in Refs. [23–25], the theoretical value of CHSH
polynomial corresponding to ρ1 in Eq. (4) can be written
as
S1 = 2
√
2pη = 2
√
2(1 − 2Q1). (8)
In practical experiment, if S1 ≤ 2 (the well-known
CHSH inequality), it indicates that the measurement re-
sults from Alice and Bob are classically correlated. Under
this case, the photon transmission process is not secure.
There exists a trivial attack for the eavesdropper that
gives him complete information without being detected.
In this way, if S1 ≤ 2, Alice and Bob have to discard
the whole DI-QSDC protocol. On the other hand, if
the CHSH polynomial 2 < S1 ≤ 2
√
2, it indicates the
measurement results from Alice and Bob are quantum
non-local correlated. Under this scale, we can bound
the eavesdropper’s photon interception rate. The max-
imal value S1 = 2
√
2 corresponds to the case that Al-
ice and Bob share maximally entangled states |φ+〉AB
(η = p = 1). In this case, the eavesdropper cannot inter-
cept any photon in the first photon transmission process
without being detected.
Step 3: When the practical S1 meets 2 < S1 ≤ 2
√
2,
Alice extracts the stored photons from the memory de-
vice. Then, Alice randomly selects a sufficiently large
subset of photons to be the checking photons and does
not perform any operation on them. For the left photons,
4she encodes her messages on them by performing one of
the four unitary operations U0, U1, U2, and U3 on each
of them. The four unitary operations can be written as
U0 = I = |H〉〈H |+ |V 〉〈V |,
U1 = σz = |H〉〈H | − |V 〉〈V |,
U2 = σx = |V 〉〈H |+ |H〉〈V |,
U3 = iσx = |H〉〈V | − |V 〉〈H |. (9)
They can make |φ+〉 evolve to |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, and |ψ−〉,
respectively, so that Alice can encode her secure mes-
sages 00, 01, 10 and 11 on the EPR pairs. It is worth
noting that for preventing the eavesdropper to precisely
intercept the correspondingM photons during the second
photon transmission process according to his intercepted
C photons in the first photon transmission process, Al-
ice messes up the M photon sequence and records the
corresponding position of each photon in the original M
sequence.
Step 4: Alice successively sends all the extracted pho-
tons in the M sequence to Bob. After the photon trans-
mission, Alice publics the position of each photon in the
original M sequence and the positions of the security
checking photons by an authorized classical channel. Bob
firstly recovers the M photon sequence based on Alice’s
records and store them into the quantum memory de-
vice. Then, he extracts his stored photons from the mem-
ory device according to the positions of security checking
photons and makes the second security checking on the
security checking photon pairs by his own. In detail,
Bob independently performs measurements on the two
photons in each checking EPR pair randomly on the ba-
sis of {A0, A1, A2} and {B1, B2}, respectively. After the
measurements of all the checking EPR pairs, he can es-
timate the CHSH polynomial (S2) and QBER (Q2) after
the second photon transmission process. Similarly, the
photon transmission loss and decoherence also obviously
influence S2 and Q2. In theory, after the second photon
transmission, the security checking photon state in Bob’s
hand has the form of
ρ2 = η
2ρ′AB +
η(1− η)
2
(|H〉b〈H |+ |V 〉b〈V |)
+
η(1− η)
2
(|H〉a〈H |+ |V 〉a〈V |)
+ (1− η)2|vac〉〈vac|, (10)
where
ρ′AB = p
2|φ+〉〈φ+|+ (1− p
2)
4
I. (11)
As a result, the theoretical value of Q2 and S2 can be
calculated as
Q2 =
1
2
(1− η2p2), (12)
S2 = 2
√
2p2η2 = 2
√
2(1−Q2). (13)
It can be found that Q2 is the total QBER after two
rounds of photon transmission. It is obvious that Q2 >
Q1 and S2 < S1.
For bounding eavesdropper’s photon interception rate
in the second photon transmission process, we also re-
quire that 2 < S2 ≤ 2
√
2. Otherwise, Alice and Bob
should discard the whole communication.
Step 5: If the parties entrust both the two photon
transmission processes, Bob can finally read out the mes-
sages from Alice by performing Bell-state analysis on the
message encoded EPR pairs in his hand [45–47].
III. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION
QUALITY OF THE DI-QSDC PROTOCOL
In the security analysis, we only require the eaves-
dropper to obey the laws of quantum physics, and no
other limitations are imposed to him. As description
in above section, here we assume the perfect entangle-
ment source, the perfect quantum memory device, and
the lossless photon detector, and analyze the effect on
DI-QSDC from quantum channel noise. We first ana-
lyze the security and communication quality of our DI-
QSDC protocol under perfect quantum channel condition
(η = p = 1). Under this case, the CHSH polynomial S1
and S2 equal to 2
√
2, and the QBERs in both two pho-
ton transmission processes are exactly 0. As a result, the
eavesdropper cannot intercept any photon in both two
photon transmission processes without being detected,
so that our DI-QSDC protocol is absolutely secure. We
define the communication efficiency (Ec) is the amount
of transmitted correct secure information qubits divided
by the total amount of the information qubits. Under
perfect quantum channel condition, it is obvious that Ec
can reach the maximum of 1.
On the other hand, under the practical noisy quan-
tum channel condition, the situation is different. The
security of our DI-QSDC protocol relies on the CHSH
polynomials S1 and S2 violating the CHSH inequality.
The photon transmission efficiency η and the value of
p both affect the values of S1 and S2. Considering η
decreases with the growth of communication distance,
the secure communication distance of DI-QSDC proto-
col will be limited. Meanwhile, according to the step 3
and step 4 of the DI-QSDC protocol, before the second
photon transmission process, Alice would mess up theM
photon sequence. This performance can effectively avoid
the precise interception of the eavesdropper in the second
photon transmission process. As a result, under the scale
of 2 < S1, S2 ≤ 2
√
2, the eavesdropper can only intercept
some photons randomly in both two photon transmission
process. Based on the estimation of DI-QKD protocol in
Ref. [23, 35], we can respectively bound the photon in-
terception rate (I) of the eavesdropper in the two photon
transmission processes by
I1(S1) ≤ χ(S1) = h(1 +
√
(S1/2)2 − 1
2
),
I2(S2) ≤ χ(S2) = h(1 +
√
(S2/2)2 − 1
2
). (14)
5Here, h is the binary entropy with the form of
h(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1− x)log2(1− x). (15)
As S2 < S1, it is obvious that the photon interception
rate in the second photon transmission process (I2) is
higher than that (I1) in the first photon transmission
process. Only if the eavesdropper can intercept both the
two photons of an EPR pair in the two photon trans-
mission processes, he can finally read out the 2 bits of
message encoded in the EPR pair by the Bell-state anal-
ysis. Therefore, we can bound the information intercep-
tion rate (IE) of the eavesdropper by
IE ≤ I1(S1). (16)
If the eavesdropper only intercepts one photon in the sec-
ond photon transmission process but does not intercept
the corresponding photon in the first photon transmission
process, he can not read out the encoded information.
However, under this case, the eavesdropper’s intercep-
tion could disturb the communication, which may makes
Bob read out the incorrect information.
Similarly, based on the estimation of DI-QKD protocol
in Ref. [23, 35], the achievable communication efficiency
(Ec1) of the DI-QSDC protocol can be given by
Ec1 ≥ 1− h(Q2)− I2(S2). (17)
 
FIG. 2: The maximal communication distance dm is plotted
as a function of p in the device-independent scenario.
From Eq. (17), we define the maximal communication
distance dm of the DI-QSDC protocol corresponding to
Ec1 = 0. It can be calculated that for obtaining Ec1 ≥ 0,
the threshold value of p must be as high as 0.926. In
Fig. 2, we show the values of dm as a function of p. It
can be found that when p = 1, which means the deco-
herence in the transmission process can be neglected, we
can obtain the maximal communication distance of the
DI-QSDC protocol is only 1.67 km. With the decrease of
p, the value of dm decrease obviously. When p decreases
to the threshold of 0.926, dm = 0. It means when the de-
coherence makes p < 0.926, no correct information can
be transmitted from Alice to Bob.
 
FIG. 3: The key generation rate (K) of the DI-QKD protocol
in Ref. [23] and Ec1 of the DI-QSDC protocol as a function
of the communication distance d in the device-independent
scenario. Here, in both DI-QKD and DI-QSDC protocols, we
control the value of p to be 1, 0.99, and 0.98, respectively.
In Fig. 3, we compare the communication efficiency of
our DI-QSDC protocol with the key generation rate (K)
of the DI-QKD protocol in Ref. [23]. Here, we control
the value of p to be 1, 0.99, and 0.98, respectively. It
can be found that with the decrease of p, both the K of
DI-QKD protocol and Ec1 of DI-QSDC protocol reduces.
Meanwhile, Ec1 of our DI-QSDC protocol is smaller than
K of DI-QKD protocol (K ≥ 1−h(Q1)−I1(S1)), and its
maximal communication distance (1.67 km) is also lower
than that of the DI-QKD (about 3.4 km). The reason is
that the DI-QSDC requires two rounds of photon trans-
mission while DI-QKD requires only one. As a result, the
influences from the environmental noise and interception
on DI-QSDC protocol are more serious than that on the
DI-QKD.
On the other hand, it can be found that the informa-
tion received by Bob may be incomplete and partly incor-
rect. We define the information loss rate (rloss) as the
amount of lost information qubits divided by the total
amount of the information qubits, and the information
error rate (rerror) as the amount of incorrect qubits read
out by Bob divided by the total amount of the informa-
tion qubits that Bob can read out. We can calculate rloss
and rerror as
rloss = 1− η2, (18)
rerror = 1− 1 + 3p
2
4
=
3
4
(1− p2). (19)
IV. MODIFICATION OF OUR DI-QSDC
PROTOCOL RESIST PRACTICAL CHANNEL
NOISE
According to above security analysis, the photon trans-
mission loss and decoherence caused by the channel noise
threaten the absolute security of the DI-QSDC and seri-
6ously limit its communication efficiency and communica-
tion distance. For overcoming the photon transmission
loss and decoherence problem during the photon trans-
mission process, we adopt the NLA protocol and EPP to
modify the DI-QSDC protocol.
A. Noiseless linear quantum amplification protocol
We introduce a deterministic entanglement-based NLA
protocol from Ref. [32] to solve the photon transmission
loss problem. The basic principle of this NLA protocol is
shown in Fig. 4. Suppose Alice generates an EPR pair in
the state of |φ+〉 and sends one photon in the EPR pair
to a distant party Bob. After transmitting through a
noisy quantum channel with the transmission efficiency
of η, the target state |φ+〉a0b0 between Alice and Bob
degrades to a mixed state as
ρin = η|φ+〉a0b0〈φ+|+
1
2
(1 − η)(|H〉a0〈H |+ |V 〉a0〈V |).
(20)
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FIG. 4: Basic setup of the linear-optical heralded noiseless
amplification (NLA) protocol for the EPR pair. PBS is a
polarizing beam splitter. D1 andD2 are standard polarization
analysis blocks shown in Ref. [48]. HWP represents a half-
wave plate and QWP represents a quarter-wave plate. Bob
selects the items which make D1 and D2 each detect exactly
one photon. In detail, Bob performs a projection polarization
measurement in the output ancillary ports with four single
photon detectors. When the detection result is |HH〉D1D2 or
|V V 〉D1D2 , he can finally distill the target state |φ
+〉a0Sout ,
while when the detection result is |HV 〉D1D2 or |V H〉D1D2 ,
he can distill |φ−〉a0Sout , which can be easily converted to
|φ+〉a0Sout with the feed-forward correction.
For overcoming the photon transmission loss, Bob
should prepare two ancillary photons in a maximally en-
tangled Bell state as
|φ+〉b1b2 =
1√
2
(|HH〉b1b2 + |V V 〉b1b2). (21)
Bob adopts four half-wave plates (HWPs) to perform
horizontal-vertical polarization swapping and six polar-
izing beam splitters to transmit the photons in |H〉 and
reflect the photons in |V 〉, respectively. After perform-
ing the amplification, Bob can only distill the items
|H〉a0 |HHH〉b0b1b2 and |V 〉a0 |V V V 〉b0b1b2 which make
the standard polarization analysis blocks D1 and D2
each detect exactly one photon. Then, by making the
single photon entering D1 (D2) pass through a quarter-
wave plate (QWP) and performing the polarization mea-
surements on the output photons, Bob can finally elim-
inate the vacuum state and distill the pure target state
|φ+〉a0Sout with the total success probability of
PNLA = 0.5η. (22)
Similarly, if the target state is one of the other three
Bell-states in Eq. (1), this NLA protocol will also work.
As a result, the NLA can completely eliminate the photon
transmission loss problem, but cannot do anything about
the decoherence.
B. Entanglement purification protocol
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FIG. 5: The schematic principle of the linear-optical entan-
glement purification protocol (EPP). Alice and Bob share two
pairs of two-photon Werner state in Eq. (3). They superpose
the photons on two PBSs, respectively and keep the items
which make each of the four output modes d1d2d3d4 contain
exactly one photon [41]. For preserving the distilled photon
state, Alice and Bob adopt two linear-optical QND gates in
d1d2 modes, respectively, whose structure is the same as the
amplifier shown in Fig. 4. Then, Alice and Bob make the pho-
tons in the d3d4 modes pass through the QWP and perform
the polarization measurements on each of the output photons.
If the measurement result is |HH〉D2D4 or |V V 〉D1D3 , they
can finally distill a new mixed state ρout1 = A1|φ
+〉d5d6〈φ
+|+
B1|ψ
+〉d5d6〈ψ
+| + C1|φ
−〉d5d6〈φ
−| + D1|ψ
−〉d5d6〈ψ
−|. If the
measurement result is |HV 〉D2D3 or |V H〉D1D4 , they can
finally distill ρout2 = C1|φ
+〉d5d6〈φ
+| + D1|ψ
+〉d5d6〈ψ
+| +
A1|φ
−〉d5d6〈φ
−| + B1|ψ
−〉d5d6〈ψ
−|, which can be easily con-
verted to ρout1 after Alice performing a local phase-flip oper-
ation on the photon in d5.
The schematic principle of the linear-optical EPP is
shown in Fig. 5. We suppose that Alice and Bob use
two pairs of ρAB in Eq. (3) in the a1b1 and a
′
1b
′
1 modes,
respectively. As shown in Ref. [41], they pass the pho-
tons in a1a
′
1 and b1b
′
1 through two PBSs, respectively
and select the items corresponding to exactly one pho-
ton in each of the four output modes of the PBSs (”four-
mode cases”). However, as all the photons are detected
by the single photon detectors, the distilled new mixed
state cannot be preserved for other applications.
7On the other hand, it can be found that the setup
of the amplifier in Fig. 4 actually plays the role of a
linear-optical quantum nondemolition detector (QND)
gate, which can distinguish the input photon number 0
and 1 without destroying the single photons. According
to Eq. (22), the success probability of each QND gate is
1
2
. In this way, we introduce two above QND gates in d1
and d2 modes to preserve the distilled photons. Then,
Alice and Bob make the photons in the d3d4 modes pass
through the QWPs and perform the polarization mea-
surements on each of the output photons. Finally, they
can distill a new mixed state in the d5d6 modes as
ρout1 = A1|φ+〉d5d6〈φ+|+B1|ψ+〉d5d6〈ψ+|
+ C1|φ−〉d5d6〈φ−|+D1|ψ−〉d5d6〈ψ−|, (23)
with the total success probability as
PE1 =
1 + p2
4
× 1
4
=
1 + p2
16
. (24)
The fidelity of the new mixed state can be written as
A1 =
5p2 + 2p+ 1
4(1 + p2)
. (25)
It has been proved that A1 is higher than the initial fi-
delity p + 1−p
4
= 1+3p
4
, when the initial fidelity satisfies
1+3p
4
> 1
2
, say, p > 1
3
. Moreover, when the protocol is
successful, Alice and Bob can also choose two pairs of
ρout1 and repeat the entanglement purification process
to further increase the fidelity of |φ+〉.
C. Application of NLA protocol and EPP in the
DI-QSDC protocol
Here, we adopt the NLA protocol and EPP in the DI-
QSDC protocol to resist the practical channel noise. The
schematic principle of our modified DI-QSDC protocol is
shown in Fig. 6. In the first photon transmission pro-
cess, we adopt the NLA protocol and EPP to construct
the near-perfect entanglement channel. In detail, Bob
first uses the NLA protocol to compensate the transmis-
sion photon loss. Once Alice emits one photon, Bob per-
forms the above NLA protocol. If the NLA protocol is
successful, Bob will tell Alice by public classical channel
to reserve the corresponding M photon. Otherwise, if
the NLA protocol fails, he will tell Alice to discard the
corresponding M photon. As a result, with the help of
the NLA protocol, Alice and Bob can completely elimi-
nate the photon transmission loss. Then, Alice and Bob
repeat the EPP to solve the decoherence problem. The
iteration number of EPP depends on the initial value of
p and the expected fidelity of |φ+〉 (i.e. 0.99). It is worth
noting that the EPP works only when the initial fidelity
satisfies p > 1
3
. If p < 1
3
, performing the EPP cannot
increase the fidelity of |φ+〉. After NLA and EPP, Alice
and Bob have successfully constructed the near-perfect
entanglement channel.
During the second photon transmission process, once
Alice emits a single photon, Bob performs the NLA pro-
tocol. If the NLA protocol is successful,he tells Alice to
encode her next message on the next photon If the NLA
protocol fails, Bob discards the corresponding photon in
the C sequence in his hand and tells Alice to recodes
this message on the next photon, and so on, until Bob
successfully receives the encoded photon. However, the
EPP cannot be used in the second photon transmission
process, for it may change the encoded secret messages of
the photons. As a result, the decoherence in the second
photon transmission process is still unavoidable.
V. SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION
QUALITY OF THE MODIFIED DI-QSDC
PROTOCOL
With the help of the NLA and EPP in the first pho-
ton transmission process, η can be increased to 1 and p
can be increased to be quite close to 1. After NLA and
EPP, Alice and Bob can construct the near-perfect entan-
glement channel and the CHSH polynomial S′1 → 2
√
2.
Under this case, we can easily obtain I ′1 → 0 and Q′1 → 0.
Therefore, it is impossible for the eavesdropper to steal
photons from the first photon transmission process with-
out being detected and the absolute security of the first
photon transmission process can be ensured. In the sec-
ond photon transmission process, with the help of NLA,
we can also obtain η = 1. In this way, we can eliminate
the message loss (r′loss = 0) and ensure the complete-
ness of the transmitted message. However, as we can-
not perform EPP on the encoded EPR pairs, the photon
state decoherence in the second photon transmission pro-
cess can reduce the value of CHSH polynomial and cause
quantum bit error. The S′2 and Q
′
2 in the modified DI-
QSDC protocol can be respectively rewritten as
S′2 = 2
√
2p, (26)
Q′2 =
1
2
− p
2
. (27)
Q′2 is the total QBER in the modified DI-QSDC protocol.
In this way, it is also possible for the eavesdropper to steal
some photons from the second photon transmission pro-
cess without being detected. In the device-independent
scenario, we can bound the interception rate (I ′2) of the
eavesdropper in the second photon transmission process
by
I ′2(S
′
2) ≤ χ(S′2) = h(
1 +
√
(S′2/2)
2 − 1
2
). (28)
According to Eq. (16), as I ′1 → 0, we can obtain the
eavesdropper’s information interception rate of the mod-
ified DI-QSDC protocol as
IE → 0. (29)
Eq. (29) agrees to that fact that the security of the DI-
QSDC can be ensured when we can ensure the absolute
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FIG. 6: The schematic principle of the modified DI-QSDC protocol. In the protocol, we adopt NLA and EPP to solve the
photon transmission loss and decoherence problems in the first photon transmission process and adopt NLA in the second
photon transmission process to compensate the photon transmission loss. The modified DI-QSDC protocol can resist the
practical channel noise and ensure its absolute security.
security of the first photon transmission process. The
reason is that after two rounds of photon transmission,
all the Bell-state analysis protocols require to perform
quantum operations or measurements on both the two
photons of an EPR pair. As long as we can ensure the
absolute security of the first photon transmission process,
the eavesdropper cannot read out any message even if he
can steal some photons in the second photon transmission
process. In this way, ensuring the absolute security of
the first photon transmission process can guarantee the
absolute security of the whole DI-QSDC.
Meanwhile, the decoherence in the second photon
transmission process can also cause information error.
The information error rate of the modified DI-QSDC can
be written as
r′error = 1−
1 + 3p
4
=
3
4
(1 − p), (30)
which is lower than that of the original DI-QSDC proto-
col in Eq. (19).
As the success probabilities of the NLA and EPP are
lower than 1, the adoption of NLA and EPP would reduce
the communication efficiency of the modified DI-QSDC
protocol. In the first photon transmission process, we as-
sume to repeat the EPP for k times to increase the value
of p. The communication efficiency Ec2 of the modified
DI-QSDC can be written as
Ec2 ≥ η
4PE1PE2 · · ·PEK
2k+2
[1− h(Q′2)− I2(S′2)]. (31)
For ensuring Ec2 ≥ 0, we can calculate the threshold
value of p to be 0.858, which is the same as that in
the DI-QKD protocol in Ref. [23]. Comparing with the
original DI-QSDC protocol, the adoption of EPP in the
first transmission process reduces the threshold value of p
from 0.926 to 0.858. In this way, the modified DI-QSDC
is easier to implement under practical noisy experimental
condition.
On the other hand, the decoherence in the second pho-
ton transmission process can still cause message error.
Comparing with original DI-QSDC protocol where the
decoherence exists in both two photon transmission pro-
cess, the message error in the modified DI-QSDC proto-
col decreases obviously.
 
FIG. 7: The logarithmic communication efficiency ( Lg (Ec))
of the modified DI-QSDC protocol as a function of the prac-
tical communication distance (d) in the device-independent
scenario. Here, we control the value of p to be 1, 0.98, 0.94,
0.90, and 0.86, respectively, and set the target value of p after
the EPP to be above 0.99.
In Fig. 7, we show the value of Lg(Ec2) as a function of
the practical communication distance d under the p = 1,
0.98, 0.94, 0.90, 0.86, respectively. In the first photon
transmission process, we aim to increase the fidelity of
9|φ+〉〈φ+| to be no less than 0.99 by repeating the EPP
for k times. In this way, when p = 1, 0.98, 0.94, 0.90,
and 0.86, we need to operate the EPP for 0, 2, 2, 2, and
3 times, respectively. By performing both the NLA and
EPP operations, we can ensure the absolute security of
the modified DI-QSDC protocol and extend its maximal
secure communication distance. The cost is that intro-
ducing NLA and EPP will lower the communication effi-
ciency (Ec2) of the DI-QSDC. Although Ec2 is relatively
low, in practical application, we can increase the initial
input power to obtain suitable information amount. For
example, we consider that the photon sources are ex-
cited with a repetition rate of 10 GHz [49]. Without the
NLA and EPP, the original DI-QSDC cannot transmit
secure and correct information beyond 1.67 km even un-
der p = 1. While with the help of the NLA and EPP,
the modified DI-QSDC can achieve communication rates
of about 25 bit/s under p = 1 and about 1 bit/s under
p = 0.9 on the distance of 100 km. Even when p is very
close to the threshold value, i.e., p = 0.86, the modi-
fied DI-QSDC can still achieve the communication rate
of about 1bit/s on the distance of 80 km.
The modified DI-QSDC protocol requires perfect en-
tanglement source, which are necessary to guarantee its
absolute security. On the other hand, the practical im-
perfect single-photon detectors and memory devices can
also be used in the modified DI-QSDC protocol. Actu-
ally, the inefficiency of the single photon detector and
memory device can be treated as photon transmission
loss. The inefficiency of photon detector and the mem-
ory devices will reduce the communication efficiency of
the modified DI-QSDC protocol. After ensuring the se-
curity, Bob can finally read out the secret messages by
performing Bell-state analysis. In linear optics, all the
Bell-state analysis protocols can only distinguish two of
the four Bell states. As a result, the message reading
efficiency of the DI-QSDC protocol is only 50%. This
will not influence the absolute security of the modified
DI-QSDC protocol, but will make the practical message
transmission efficiency be half of the communication effi-
ciency. In practical experiment, we can only encode two
secret messages 0 and 1 on the EPR pairs by performing
two of the four unitary operations U0, U1, U2, and U3
on the M photons. Under this case, the practical mes-
sage transmission efficiency equals to the communication
efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the quantum secure communication field, DI not
only represents a relaxation of the security assumptions
made in usual quantum communication protocols, but
also can enhance the security of the quantum communi-
cation, especially in the device-independent scenario. In
the paper, we put forward the first DI-QSDC protocol. In
the DI-QSDC protocol, Alice can directly send the secure
message to Bob by two rounds of photon transmission.
Similar as the previous DI-QKD protocols, the absolute
security and correction of the DI-QSDC protocol can be
ensured based on two rounds of non-locality test, where
the CHSH inequality provides us an estimation of eaves-
dropper’s knowledge and the communication efficiency.
Here, we mainly consider the influence from the practi-
cal channel noise on the security and communication ef-
ficiency of DI-QSDC protocol. In the absence of channel
noise, the DI-QSDC protocol is absolutely secure and no
quantum bit error exists. Meanwhile, there is no limit
to its communication distance. However, under practi-
cal noisy channel condition, the photon transmission loss
and photon state decoherence have serious influences on
the DI-QSDC. The maximal communication distance of
the DI-QSDC protocol is only 1.67 km, which is lower
than that of the DI-QKD protocol (about 3.4 km). The
threshold value of quantum state fidelity p is 0.926. As
the DI-QSDC protocol requires two photon transmission
processes while DI-QKD only requires one, the eaves-
dropper can steal the encoded information only when he
intercepts both the two photons in an EPR pair. In this
way, the eavesdropper’s information interception rate is
lower than that of the DI-QKD. However, any quantum
bit error and eavesdropper’s photon interception in both
two photon transmission process can disturb the commu-
nication, which makes Bob cannot read out the correct
information. As a result, the communication efficiency
of DI-QSDC protocol is also lower than that of the DI-
QKD protocol. Meanwhile, the photon transmission loss
and decoherence would also lead to the information loss
and information error, which will also seriously limit the
practical application of DI-QSDC.
For overcoming the photon transmission loss and de-
coherence problems in the photon transmission process,
we introduce the NLA protocol and EPP to modify the
DI-QSDC protocol. We adopt the NLA protocol in both
two photon transmission processes to completely com-
pensate the photon transmission loss, so that, the in-
formation loss can be totally eliminated. We adopt the
EPP in the first photon transmission process to construct
the near-perfect quantum channel, so that the eavesdrop-
per almost cannot steal any photon in the first photon
transmission process without being detected. In the sec-
ond photon transmission process, we cannot perform the
EPP on the encoded photon EPR pairs, for the EPP
may change the encoded secure information. As a re-
sult, the photon state decoherence still exists, which may
cause the quantum bit error and provide the eavesdrop-
per an opportunity to steal some photons without being
detected. However, as the eavesdropper cannot perform
Bell-state analysis when he only captures one of the two
photons in an EPR pair, the absolute security of the
first photon transmission process guarantees the abso-
lute security of the whole modified DI-QSDC protocol.
Meanwhile, due to the introduction of EPP in the first
photon transmission process, the modified DI-QSDC pro-
tocol can reduce the threshold value of p from 0.926 to
0.858 and reduce the information error. We assume that
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the photon sources are excited with a repetition rate of
10 GHz. The modified DI-QSDC can achieve communi-
cation rates of about 25 bit/s under p = 1 and about
1 bit/s under p = 0.9 on the distance of 100 km. Even
when p is very close to the threshold value (p = 0.86), the
modified DI-QSDC can still achieve the communication
rate of about 1 bit/s on the distance of 80 km. Based
on above features, the modified DI-QSDC protocol may
have application potential in the practical imperfect con-
dition in the future.
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